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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis studies the effects of different signal injection attacks against a time-
delayed networked cyber-physical system (CPS). A CPS is an industrial control system 
which integrates computer networks and physical processes. CPSs are used in critical 
areas such as transportation and manufacturing. A networked control system is one that 
allows the controller and plant to be geographically separated by sending the control 
and measurement signals over a communication network. The convenience of 
controlling a plant remotely comes at the cost of increased security risk. An adversary 
who gains access to the network may intercept the signals and corrupt them or simply 
prevent the transmission of the signals, which may cause considerable damage to the 
system.  The four types of attacks simulated are i) covert misappropriation attack, ii) 
replay attack, iii) undetectable attack, and iv) worst-case signal attacks. In all of these 
cases, the attacker is assumed to have access to the communication network used to 
send the actuation and measurement signals. All of the attacks are implemented 
successfully. The covert misappropriation attack resulted in over percent error in the 
nominal output signal while remaining undetected. The replay attack resulted well above 
one-hundred percent error and is likely to cause considerable damage to the system. 
The undetectable actuator attack forced the controller to expend more energy than 
necessary for a brief period to achieve the nominal output. The worst-case attack 
caused the controller to expend significantly more energy during the entire simulation in 
order to achieve the nominal output.   
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CHAPTER ONE  
INTRODUCTION 
Cyber-physical systems (CPS) connect physical processes through a network of 
connected elements, such as actuators, sensors, and controllers. They are used in 
many fields including transportation [10], medical devices [11], and industrial process 
control [12]. One example of a CPS is a natural gas pipeline network. Natural gas is 
collected from a well, sent through a gathering system where it is processed, and then 
sent through the transmission system [24]. The transmission system is composed of 
272,000 miles of steel pipe and moves the natural gas thousands of miles to local 
distribution companies. The pressure inside the transmission system pipeline is 
controlled by compressor stations, located every 50 to 60 miles along the pipeline. Most 
of the compressor stations are completely automated, meaning the pressure inside the 
pipeline is regulated from a remote control station. The control station monitors and 
records operational data from each compressor station. The gas reaches a local 
distribution company, which also has a control center which monitors and controls the 
flow rate and pressure via various sensors and computer programs as the gas is sent to 
the customer [24]. Normal operation of these systems is often required to prevent 
considerable damage, whether it be to machines or employees. When control signals 
and sensor readings are able to be sent over a wireless communication network, this 
allows for controllers to be located off-site and used to control the plant remotely. The 
downside to this is that the network becomes vulnerable to attacks. Adversaries may 
gain access to the network, intercept the signals being sent, and corrupt them. 
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Therefore, these wireless control system networks must be secure to ensure safe 
operation. The type of attack described previously is called a “man-in-the-middle” attack 
and has been studied greatly on networked control systems [3],[4],[5],[6]. In [27], 
researchers successfully performed a replay attack on an implantable cardioverter 
defibrillator (ICD) introduced into the US market in 2003. This replay attack 
compromised the device‟s integrity by changing stored information or therapy settings 
[27].  These ICDs are designed to administer an electrical shock to the patient when an 
irregular heartbeat is detected in order to restore a normal heartbeat rhythm. The device 
can then report that a shock was administered via wireless capabilities to a healthcare 
provider, who is able to modify the device‟s settings without surgery [27]. Between 1990 
and 2002, more than 2.6 million pacemakers and ICDs were implanted in patients in the 
United States [28]. The work in [27] showed that attacks on the privacy, integrity, and 
availability of the ICD data are possible. A reprogramming attack is demonstrated which 
changes the way the ICD operates, allowing a malicious entity to issue a commanded 
electrical shock. Also, the researchers demonstrated that the ICD disclosed sensitive 
information without encryption [27]. The demonstration of these security flaws in a 
device already implanted in patients is enough to cause concern for safety. Cyber-
physical system attacks have successfully been carried out and are documented in 
[13],[14],[15],[16]. In [16], an attack is documented wherein an attacker used a laptop 
computer and a radio transmitter to take control of 150 sewage pumping stations and 
released one million liters of untreated sewage into a stormwater drain, where it flowed 
into local waterways. The reason for the attack is because Mr. Boden, the attacker, was 
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angry that he was not offered employment by the Maroochy Shire Council [16]. One of 
the most famous cyber-security attacks is the Stuxnet worm [17], which affected a 
uranium enrichment facility in Iran. The worm gained access to the supervisor control 
and data acquisition system (SCADA) used to operate the centrifuges and sent 
malicious control signals to cause them to malfunction with considerable damage to the 
system. The designers of the SCADA systems originally did not consider security 
concerns such as integrity checking, anti-replay checking, authentication, or anti-
repudiation due to the assumption that SCADA systems would be isolated from other 
networks. SCADA communication protocols such as Modbus, Distributed Network 
Protocol 3 (DNP3), and Allen-Bradley Ethernet/Internet Protocol (IP) do not provide 
mechanisms to check for integrity or freshness of data received [25],[26]. Therefore, 
systems that employ these communication protocols are susceptible to denial-of-service 
attacks (DoS), man-in-the-middle attacks, and replay attacks [26]. The 
accomplishments of the previously referenced attacks and security flaws in the listed 
SCADA communication protocols raise concern for the security of critical cyber-physical 
systems operating today.  
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze four different signal attacks on a 
networked control system with time delays to show how such attacks may affect the 
system. Chapter two introduces the nominal control system, describes the canal testbed 
to be used as a model for all attacks, and the controller used for the canal system. The 
chapter shows the system performance under normal operation. Chapter three shows 
the effect of a covert misappropriation attack, where control signals are summed with a 
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malicious signal before reaching the plant, and the effect of the malicious signal on the 
plant is removed before the output of the plant reaches the controller, thus remaining 
undetected. Chapter four presents the effect of a replay attack, in which sensor signals 
are monitored and recorded for a period of time and relayed to the controller at a future 
time while suppressing real-time sensor readings, thus rendering the attack 
undetectable. Chapter five shows the effect of an attack, which is undetectable by a 
dynamic monitor. A dynamic monitor is an algorithm which constantly checks if the 
system is under attack [8]. Chapter six shows the effect of a worst-case signal attack, in 
which the objective of the attack is not to remain undetected, but to maximize the cost 
function and perform the most damage to the system. Chapter seven contains 
concluding remarks. 
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CHAPTER TWO  
INTRODUCTION OF THE NOMINAL SYSTEM 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The nominal system is described and illustrated in [1] and shown in Figure 1. The 
variables in Figure 1 represent the following parameters: 
 
   – Output signal of the nominal controller – Dimension (2x1) 
   Input signal to the plant – Dimension (2x1) 
  – Actuator disturbances – Dimension (2x1) 
  – Output of the plant – Dimension (2x1) 
  – Sensor noise – Dimension (2x1) 
   – Output sensor data received by the controller (2x1) 
     – Output refence signal – Dimension (2x1) 
 
In Figure 1,   represents the plant and   represents the nominal controller for the plant. 
Both the actuation and measurement signals are transmitted between the plant and the 
controller over a communication network uninterrupted and unmodified [1]. 
Communication delays and packet losses are not considered for simplicity. In the 
nominal case,      and       .The plant is assumed to be linear time-invariant 
(LTI) and is driven by disturbances w, and a control signal      such that  
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Here, Pu and Pw are LTI operators that map signals uc and w to the output y [1]. In other 
words, they are operators that represent the plant‟s effect on signals    and  . The 
output measured by the nominal controller is corrupted with noise such that 
 
        
 
The nominal controller outputs the control signal such that 
 
                . 
 
 
Figure 1. Nominal Control System Diagram [1]. 
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2.2 MIMO Open Flow Canal 
 
An open flow canal system described originally in [2] is used as a testbed to carry 
out the attacks. The system is composed of two pools with two sluice gates and a 
downstream spillway, illustrated in Figure 2 and Figure 3. A servomotor is used in each 
gate to drive the control gate positions u1 and u2. There are two level sensors located 
downstream of the first and second gates (h1 and h2, respectively). The reservoir is kept 
at a constant level of 3.5 m. The length of the first pool is 2 km and the length of the 
second pool is 4 km.  
 
 
Figure 2. Open Flow Canal Illustration [33]. 
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This system can be modeled by two Saint-Venant equations. The simplified model is 
derived in [2] and shown below. The system takes the form 
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Figure 3. Simplified Open Flow Canal Diagram [2]. 
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Each delay     is associated with the travelling time of water between each input and 
output [2]. By defining    to be the travelling time of water to cover the first pool and    to 
be the travelling time of water to cover the second pool as in Lemma 2.2 in [2], the 
following relation can be shown: 
 
                               
 
By using this relation and separating the rational and irrational part of the plant, the 
following final plant is derived [2]: 
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] [
  
  
]  
 
Where         ,          ,        ,        ,          seconds,          
seconds,          seconds,          seconds,        seconds and        
seconds. 
 
2.3 Uncontrolled System Response  
 
The uncontrolled system response to a reference step change in    from 0.64 
meters to 0.94 meters at 200 minutes and    held at a constant 0.96 meters is shown in 
Figure 4. 
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Figure 4. Uncontrolled Canal System Response. 
 
From observation, it is clear that the outputs    and    do not follow the setpoints. 
Instead of    rising from 0.64 meters to 0.94 meters, it only rises from 0.35 meters to 
0.61 meters. The setpoint of    is held at 0.96 meters, but the output only settles at 0.71 
meters. Also, the coupling of the two outputs is clear; the reference step change in    
produces a large disturbance in the output   , which deviates from its setpoint 0.08 
meters at the peak of the disturbance. Another problem is the large overshoot evident in 
the system response. For these reasons, a controller must be used to compensate for 
the tracking error between the setpoint and the output, to decouple the two outputs, and 
to reduce the overshoot present in the system response.  
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2.4 Controller Description 
 
The controller for this system is originally derived in [2]. The rational part of the 
plant model is: 
 
       [
    
       
     
       
    
       
    
       
]  
 
To guarantee nominal internal stability, any stabilizing controller, its sensitivity, its 
complement, and the transfer function from the reference to the control signal are 
respectively: 
 
         [           ]
                                        (1) 
                   
                 
                      
 
for any stable and proper matrix Q(s) [2]. To achieve complete diagonal sensitivities and 
achieve robust stability, Q(s), Tm(s), and Sm(s) are chosen to be: 
 
     [          ]
  [
     
     
]                            (2) 
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]  
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where      is a weight used to counteract the delay uncertainties and is taken to be 
 
       
   
    
           
 
where      is the identity matrix,       , and          
   [2]. Next, a low-order 
performance weight is selected to reject constant and low frequency disturbances as 
follows: 
 
       
    
  
      
 
where          
   [2]. To achieve robustness,      is chosen as: 
 
     
   
            
                                              (3) 
 
where        ,       and             in order to cancel the pole in     of 
     . Using equations (1), (2), and (3), the following proper controller is derived: 
 
     [          ]
  [
     
     
] [           ]
   
 
 13 
 
which simplifies to [2] 
 
       
     
        
 [       (     )   ]
  
 
Finally,      is replaced as a function of      using equation (1) which is easier to 
implement, resulting in the final controller used for this system. 
 
2.5 Nominal System Performance 
 
The nominal system response is simulated in Figure 5. A noise signal is not applied in 
the simulations in this thesis in order to make comparisons clearer. The setpoint of the 
output    is stepped up from 0.64 meters to 0.94 meters at 200 minutes, while the 
setpoint of     is kept at a constant 0.96 meters. From 800 to 1200 minutes, a 
disturbance pulse signal is produced equivalent to raising the sluice gate    by 0.01 
meters is applied. Figure 5 5 shows the nominal canal system water levels    and    
response to a reference point change in gate   .  From Figure 5, it can be observed that 
the tracking error of    goes to zero due to the integral action of the controller. Also, the 
controller successfully rejects the applied disturbance due to the selection of parameter 
   in the performance weight   . The decoupling characteristic of the controller is 
apparent; the amplitude of output    is raised 0.3 meters, but the output    only moves 
0.01 meters from its setpoint during the step. In the next chapter, the covert 
misappropriation attack is introduced and performed on the system. 
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Figure 5. Nominal Canal System Response. 
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CHAPTER THREE  
COVERT MISAPPROPRIATION ATTACK 
3.1 Introduction 
 
 The covert misappropriation attack is a type of man-in-the-middle attack and is 
described in [1]. The covert agent is assumed to have infiltrated the communication 
network in a way that allows the control signal    and sensor measurement signal    to 
be read and modified. This attack allows the adversary to intercept the actuation signal, 
add a malicious component to it designed to force the plant to output a signal other than 
the setpoint specified by the nominal controller, and then remove the effect of the 
malicious signal from the plant‟s output before it is fed back to the controller. This attack 
allows the attacker to send the plant‟s output to a desired value without the nominal 
controller‟s knowledge. The system under a covert misappropriation attack is illustrated 
in Figure 6 6 [1]. The attacker calculates the nominal plant‟s response   to its injected 
signal   and subtracts it from the measured plant‟s output. The two components of the 
covert agent structure are the model of the nominal plant    and the covert controller  . 
It can be deduced that if the attacker knows the exact model of the plant, then the 
injected signal‟s effect on the nominal plant can be calculated exactly and the attack is 
completely undetectable [1]. This case has already been studied in [7]. For this 
example,    will be assumed to contain model errors in order to show that the attack 
can still be carried out undetected with modeling errors. The covert plant can be 
represented by 
 16 
 
 
Figure 6. Covert Misappropriation Attack Diagram [1]. 
 
        
 
where   represents the additive model error of the covert plant [1]. For this attack, the 
attacker does not need any knowledge of the nominal controller in order to perform the 
attack undetected. In this case, the actuation signal that is received by the plant is now 
 
        
 
The measured output signal received by the nominal controller is now 
 17 
 
 
          
 
The signals   and   are calculated in the feedback loop 
 
      
                
 
3.2 Canal System Under Covert Misappropriation Attack 
 
 The same open-flow canal testbed is used to demonstrate the covert 
misappropriation attack. The covert agent‟s plant model is given by [1] 
 
   [
  
        
] [
      
         
       
         
      
         
      
         
] [ 
       
  
]  
   
where        and        and are used to represent the model errors of the covert 
plant. These model errors contribute to increasing the time delays, gains, and time 
constants by up to a factor of 2 [1]. The covert controller   is calculated using the same 
approach derived in Section 2.2, with the rational part of the plant taken to be 
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        [
      
         
       
         
      
         
      
         
].  
 
The covert misappropriation attack is simulated with the setpoint      equal to zero 
before 200 minutes and equal to 0.1 meters after 200 minutes. The results are shown in 
Figure 7. The effect of the attack is clear. The measured output of    seen by the 
nominal controller is equal to 0.94 meters, while the actual level of    is 0.84 meters. 
This results in a 10.64 percent error from the nominal reference setpoint of   , and 
without any mitigation techniques, this attack is undetectable by the controller. In the 
next chapter, the replay attack is introduced and performed on the system. 
 
 
Figure 7. System Response Under Covert Misappropriation Attack. 
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CHAPTER FOUR  
REPLAY ATTACK 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, the nominal system will be subjected to a replay attack. A replay 
attack is a type of network attack “in which an attacker detects a data transmission and 
fraudulently has it delayed or repeated” [21]. The adversary intercepts and records the 
data transmission and transmits the same data at a later time while suppressing the 
real-time data. Without proper mitigation, a network subject to a replay attack would 
interpret the repeated transmission as legitimate [21]. Even if the data is encrypted and 
the adversary cannot decrypt it, a repeated transmission of legitimate data across a 
network would still be received as legitimate.  
 
4.2 Mathematical Explanation 
 
 Let the nominal control signal be      , the control signal received by the plant be 
    , and the malicious control signal under a replay attack be      . Let the nominal 
output signal of the plant be     . Let the nominal output measurement signal be       
and the output measurement signal under a replay attack be   
    . Let the sensor noise 
at time   be     . Let the time of system operation begin at    and end at   . Let the time 
length of recording       span from     to     and the time of the replay attack span 
from     to    . Therefore, the signals can be represented as: 
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                          . 
 
The diagram of the system under a replay attack during time           is shown in 
Figure 8.  
 
 
Figure 8. System Diagram Under a Replay Attack. 
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4.3 Canal System Under Replay Attack 
 
For this section, the measured sensor output signal    will be recorded for a 
period of time, and then relayed to the controller at a future time period while preventing 
the transmission of    during that period. To create the attacked signal for simulation 
purposes, the nominal system‟s output is recorded from 33.33 minutes to 366.67 
minutes. Then from 1533.3 minutes to 1866.7 minutes, the nominal system‟s output 
signal is suppressed and replaced with the previously recorded output signal. The 
nominal signal and the attacked signal are illustrated in Figure 9. 
 
 
Figure 9. Nominal System Output and Replay Attack Signal. 
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The canal simulation is performed again, but this time the feedback signal to the 
controller is disconnected and replaced with the created attacked signals. The system 
response to the replay attack is shown in Figure 10. The replay attack‟s effect on the 
canal system is evident. When the step change from 0.94 meters to 0.64 meters of the 
attacked signal of    at 1533 minutes occurs, the controller response causes the 
nominal plant to send the height of    to 2.45 meters. This is due to the reference point 
of    being set to 0.94 meters and the false    output signal indicating that the plant‟s 
output has fallen to 0.64 meters. Therefore, the controller sees this false output and 
tries to correct it by sending actuator signals to quickly raise the output of    back to 
0.94 meters, when in reality, the output was already at 0.94 meters and the controller 
was fooled into raising the output of    even more. This attack led to a 160.6 percent 
error in the    response when compared to the nominal output, and without any attack 
mitigation techniques, this attack would be undetected by the controller and cause 
considerable damage to the system. The effect of this attack is much greater than that 
of the covert misappropriation attack, where the percent error in the    response was 
10.64 percent. On the other hand, the replay attack is likely to be noticed by employees 
due to the extreme change in the output of   , but the covert misappropriation attack 
can likely be executed for a longer period of time due to the smaller effect of the attack 
on   . The replay attack could be used to cause damage to the system, where the 
covert misappropriation attack may be better used in order to deceive the controller for 
a longer period of time. In the next chapter, the undetectable attack is introduced and 
performed on the system. 
 23 
 
 
Figure 10. System Response to a Replay Attack. 
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CHAPTER FIVE  
UNDETECTABLE ATTACK 
5.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, the system will be subjected to an undetectable sensor attack and 
an undetectable actuator attack. These attacks are described and defined in [9],[32] and 
solved explicitly in [8]. In this reference, an undetectable attack is defined as one “that is 
undetectable by a dynamic monitor.” A dynamic monitor is “an algorithm which has 
access to the system dynamics and outputs                 , and checks for the 
presence of attacks at all times” [9],[32] where       are the state-space matrices of 
the system and represent the system dynamics. The reference states that an attack 
        is undetectable if and only if for some initial state     
 : 
 
 (    (     )  )                   
 
where        (     )    is the output of the system due to the initial state   , the 
control signal  , the under-attack actuator signal   , and the under-attack sensor signal 
   [9],[32]. The undetectable sensor attack signal is derived in [8] and results in the 
signal: 
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Therefore, the sensor attack is always possible if the attacker knows the system‟s state-
space matrices     and the initial state   . The undetectable actuator attack is also 
derived in [8] and results in the signal: 
 
       
   
        
                 
 
where 
 
       ∫  
       
    
 
 
 
 
is the controllability gramian, and       represent the conjugate transpose of system 
matrices   and  , respectively. 
  
5.2 Canal System Under Undetectable Attack 
 
The inherent time delays of the canal system are not accounted for in the 
undetectable sensor and actuator attacks derived in [8]. Therefore, the Padé 
approximation [18] is used to estimate the delays in the irrational plant to obtain a 
rational approximation. This estimation was computed using the        command in 
MATLAB [19]. The minimum realization of the resulting system was then obtained using 
the MATLAB command           [20].  The resulting transfer function matrix of the 
system is: 
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   [
                     
                       
         
           
                                  
                                   
                      
                       
]  
 
The Padé-approximated system‟s nominal system response and the original system‟s 
response are plotted in Figure 11. The approximation resulted in the system containing 
uncontrollable states. Because the actuator attack relies on the controllability gramian of 
the system and requires no uncontrollable states, the undetectable attacks were only 
performed on the part of the system relating input 1 to output 1, which contains no 
uncontrollable states.  
 
 
Figure 11. Nominal System Output with Original Time Delays and Nominal System 
Output with Padé Approximated Time Delays. 
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This corresponds to the transfer function in row one, column one of   , which will be 
referred to as     . The state-space representation of      is obtained and the 
undetectable sensor and actuator attacks are simulated and shown in Figures 12-19. It 
can be observed from Figure 12Figure 12 that the amplitude of the sensor attack signal 
   is relatively small, only reaching a peak of        
   meters. The sensor attack 
signal also quickly converges to zero. This is due to the system dynamics of the 
approximated canal system. It can also be observed from Figure 13 and Figure 14 that 
the effect of the sensor attack on the control input    and the output of      is negligible 
due to the dynamics of the system. Figure 16Figure 16 and Figure 17 show that the 
actuator attack signal    has a negligible effect on the canal system due to the system 
dynamics. Figure 18 and Figure 19 show that even when both attacks are applied 
simultaneously, their effect is still negligible. In the next chapter, the worst-case 
bounded sensor signal attack is introduced and applied to the system. 
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Figure 12. Undetectable Sensor Attack Signal   . The signal only reaches a height of 
       meters. 
 
Figure 13. Undetectable Sensor Attack Effect on Control Signal   . The effect of the 
attack is negligible. 
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Figure 14. Undetectable Sensor Attack Effect on the Output of     . The output stays 
the same under the attack. 
 
 
Figure 15. Undetectable Actuator Attack Signal   . The signal quickly converges to zero 
due to the system dynamics. 
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Figure 16. Undetectable Actuator Attack Effect on Control Signal    . The controller s 
forced to exert more energy in the attacked case. 
 
 
Figure 17. Undetectable Actuator Attack Effect on the Output of     . The output stays 
relatively the same. 
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Figure 18. Undetectable Sensor and Actuator Attack Effect on Control Signal   . The 
effect of the attack is negligible. 
 
 
Figure 19. Undetectable Sensor and Actuator Attack Effect on the Output of     . The 
output stays the same.  
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CHAPTER SIX  
WORST-CASE BOUNDED SIGNAL ATTACK 
6.1 Introduction 
 
In this Chapter, the canal system will be subject to a worst-case sensor attack. The 
attack in this Chapter is originally described in [8]. The goal of this attack is not to 
remain undetected, but to inflict maximal damage by maximizing the control cost 
function of the system. For this attack, a linear-quadratic controller is used for the 
system instead of the controller previously derived. The control law minimizes the cost 
function shown below while the worst-case attack signal maximizes it [22]: 
 
   
‖  ‖   
      [      
   
    
{      ∫                  
 
 
  }  
 
The MATLAB function       is used to compute state-feedback control law [22]. 
An LQI controller was used instead of the LQR controller due to steady-state errors 
occurring when using the LQR controller. The integral term in the LQI controller forces 
the steady-state error to converge to zero. The state-feedback control of the LQI control 
scheme is of the form         [    ]. The new state-space representation of the 
system with the LQI control implemented is derived as: 
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The control law diagram is shown below in Figure 20 [22]. 
 
 
Figure 20. Diagram of the LQI Control Scheme [22]. 
 
 The function [     ]                 calculates the optimal gain matrix  , given a 
state-space model     for the plant and weighting matricies       [22]. The Padé-
approximated system previously computed is used for    .       are chosen to be 
             ,         , and  , respectively.  
 
The performance of the nominal controller is shown below in Figure 21. 
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Figure 21. Nominal System Performance with LQI Control. 
 
It should be noted that this type of controller cannot be used on this system in reality, as 
the state variables of this system measure by the controller are not tied to physical 
parameters but can be related to physical states using a similarity transformation. The 
purpose of this Chapter is simply to show the effect of such an attack on a canal system 
with these properties. The optimal sensor attack for infinite horizon LQI control is 
derived in [8] and [30], and also used in [29]. The cost function for this problem is 
derived as 
 
           
   
{∫                          
 
 
}      
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where   is a positive semi-definite matrix,   is the vector of state variables,   is the 
vector of control variables, and   is the output matrix in the state-space representation 
of the plant [8],[29],[30]. The minimizing control input is given by         where   is 
the solution of the algebraic Riccati equation [23]: 
 
                    
 
In the infinite horizon case for bounded sensor attack signals,     
  [        ,  
meaning         [   ‖     ‖   , where ess sup stands for essential supremum, for 
some    , and with ‖ ‖   , the optimal sensor attack signal is 
 
              
 
where    [         is the space    is a scalar representing the maximum bound 
threshold an attacker can expend, and    is the normalized right singular vector 
corresponding to the maximal singular value of     [8],[29],[30]. The optimal worst-case 
actuator attack is not used in this thesis, but it is derived in [8],and [31], and used in 
[29]. 
6.2 Numerical Results 
 
The nominal system is subjected to this sensor attack with      and the 
results are shown in the Figures 22 and 23. 
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Figure 22. Output    with and without Optimal Sensor Attack. 
 
 
Figure 23. Control Input    with and without Optimal Sensor Attack. 
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From Figure 22 it can be observed that the controller eventually corrects the output    
to converge to the nominal value after 150 minutes. On the other hand, it can be 
observed from Figure 23 that the control signal energy expended is 0.16 units higher 
than in the nominal case for the entire duration of the simulation. Therefore, this attack 
succeeded in maximizing the cost function of the system. Compared to the covert 
misappropriation attack, the effect of this attack does not affect the output    as much 
but forces the controller to expend more energy. The replay attack on this system has a 
higher impact on the output of system due to the 160.6 percent error in   . The worst-
case bounded sensor attack forces the controller to exert much more energy than the 
undetectable attack. The next chapter contains concluding remarks.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN  
CONCLUSION 
 Four types of malicious cyber-physical system signal attacks have been 
described, and their effects on a time-delayed system have been analyzed. All of the 
attacks were implemented successfully. The covert misappropriation and replay attacks 
caused significant error between the nominal output and the under-attack output. The 
effects of the undetectable sensor attack were negligible due to the system dynamics 
and only one part of the system being attacked. The effect of the undetectable actuator 
attack was also negligible but resulted in a larger control signal and therefore expended 
more energy than necessary. The covert misappropriation attack resulted in a 10.64 
percent error in the nominal output signal while remaining undetected. The replay attack 
resulted in a 160.6 percent error and is likely to cause considerable damage to the 
system. The undetectable actuator attack forced the controller to expend more energy 
than necessary for a brief period to achieve the nominal output. The worst-case attack 
caused the output    to deviate around 0.12 meters from the nominal response, but 
after 150 minutes, the output signal converged the nominal value. However, the 
controller was still affected throughout the whole simulation and the attack caused it to 
excerpt significantly more energy than required in the nominal case. Future work 
includes performing the undetectable sensor and actuator attacks on a different 
networked control system, in which all states of the plant are controllable with system 
dynamics such that the effect of the attack is more pronounced. Another area that could 
 39 
 
be studied in the future is developing mitigation strategies and detection algorithms for 
the covert misappropriation attack, undetectable attacks, and worst-case sensor attack.  
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